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The cost of civil litigation is a key factor in determining the extent of access to justice. 
Following cuts in legal aid attention has focused upon finding alternative methods of 
assisting litigants without producing costs which are out of proportion to the damages 
obtained. The recent report by Lord Justice Jackson attempts to deal with concerns 
about increasing and disproportionate costs said to arise in part because of the 
encouragement of conditional fee agreements. This article considers the proposals 
made in the report, and argues that too little attention has been paid to before-the-
event insurance as a means of securing access to justice for the great majority of 
claimants who suffer personal injury. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
INTRODUCTION 
This article looks at particular recommendations made by Lord Justice Jackson in 
his review of the costs of civil litigation.1 In a two volume report running to over a 
thousand pages he proposes to make radical changes. If the complex, inter-related 
reforms are all introduced, they would be even more significant than those procedural 
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1 R. Jackson LJ, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (London: Judiciary of England and 
Wales, January 2010), and R. Jackson LJ, Civil Litigation Costs Review – Preliminary Report by Lord 
Justice Jackson (London: Judiciary of England and Wales, May 2009). The review was commissioned 
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changes set in train by Lord Woolf fifteen years ago.2 The proposals have been much 
discussed by the legal profession but, as yet, they have largely escaped the attention of 
academic law journals.3 They received support in a recent report on compensation 
culture,4 and the Government have announced that they are to form the foundation for 
its reform of civil litigation. The Jackson proposals are to be taken forward as a matter 
of priority.5 
Here the focus is upon one particular issue: the potential use of before-the-event 
insurance (BTE). This is insurance against future legal costs that was in place before 
the event which gave rise to the claim, such as the accident which caused the injury. It 
is sometimes referred to as legal expenses insurance, although that term can also 
include after-the-event insurance (ATE) where a policy is taken out after the accident 
in order to cover the risk of having to pay the opponent’s legal costs. Although this 
article therefore has a narrow focus it nevertheless makes wider points about the 
problems identified by the Jackson report and the solutions it proposes. Reforming 
BTE could have wide repercussions on litigation, especially in cases involving 
personal injury. Whether extending this particular means of obtaining representation 
would lead to an increase in access to justice is a question which has divided 
                                                 
2 Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in 
England and Wales (London: HMSO, July 1996). 
3 But see the general review by A.S. Zuckerman, “The Jackson Final Report on Costs – Plastering the 
Cracks to Shore up a Dysfunctional System” (2010) 29 (3) Civil Justice Q 263 – 283, and contrast M. 
Lyons, “Jackson – An Initial Response” [2010] J Personal Injury Law 74 – 92. 
4 Lord Young, Common Sense Common Safety (2010). This is a report to the Prime Minister following 
a Whitehall-wide review of the operation of health and safety laws and the growth of the compensation 
culture, and at p 22 it recommends that Jackson’s proposals be adopted as soon as possible.  
http://www.number10.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/402906_CommonSense_acc.pdf  
5 Ministry of Justice, Proposals for Reform of Civil Litigation Funding and Costs in England and 
Wales (Consultation Paper CP13/10) (Cm 7947) (London: Ministry of Justice, November 2010) section 
1.1. 
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practitioners; but whether it could offer a more workable solution than some of those 
put forward by Jackson may provoke a more favourable response. The argument here 
is that more attention should be paid to BTE than has previously been the case: it may 
hold the key to access to justice for many potential litigants. 
SHIFTING THE COST FROM PUBLIC TO PRIVATE SOURCES 
Against a political background where all parties agree that substantial cuts in public 
expenditure are required, it is not realistic to expect much support for an increase in 
public funding to enable civil cases to be litigated.6 It is to private funding that we 
must turn if we seek to make it easier to obtain civil redress. However, we should not 
forget that until recently public funding for personal injury cases was common. Where 
would we be now had it remained available? 
The question is an unusual one because legal aid for such claims already seems to 
be a relic from the remote past, and there is no suggestion that it should be revived. 
Legal aid was indeed ‘the most friendless wing of the welfare state.’7 Although in 
personal injury cases it may have cost the Treasury little (partly because of the welfare 
benefits that were recovered from insurers), the apparent exponential increase in 
expenditure made legal aid in general an easy target. Even if it had continued in place, 
there is good reason to believe that it would now be a vestige of its former self. The 
current prescribed rates for assistance do not meet expenses, and financial eligibility 
has collapsed to about 36 per cent of the population.8 David Marshall, a former 
President of the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers (APIL), notes: ‘In effect 
                                                 
6 In the Ministry of Justice Consultation Paper ibid the Government proposes further substantial cuts to 
legal aid amounting to £350 million to help to provide a real reduction of 23% in the Ministry’s budget 
by 2014-2015. 
7 S. Hynes and J. Robins, The Justice Gap: Whatever Happened to Legal Aid? (London: Legal Action 
Group, 2009) chapter 2. 
8 This is actually a 7 per cent increase compared to two years previously, but this reflects only a 
downturn in the economy not an increase in eligibility rates. See Final Report n 1 above p 68 para 3.1. 
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“public funding” is now a “no win, lower fee” conditional fee agreement for the 
socially excluded only, but without a success fee for taking the risk of losing.’9 
That is, if solicitors accept legal aid cases today, they must work at very low rates 
which cannot be increased in the event of claims being won. Marshall suggests that by 
now, in an unreformed system, solicitors in high value cases would have been forced 
to fund litigation by using contingency fees with clients paying lawyers from the 
damages they were awarded. As for the mass of low value claims, solicitors would 
have abandoned the work and left it to unqualified claims assessors. We would have a 
very different tort system. 
The Access to Justice Act 1999 removed almost all legal aid for personal injury 
cases. As a substitute, it encouraged the use of conditional fee agreements (CFAs) 
which had first been made lawful only four years earlier.10 Claimant lawyers could 
secure an increase in their fees in each case that they won under such an arrangement. 
They could recover up to double their costs if they were successful, but nothing at all 
if they lost.11 Claimants themselves were encouraged to litigate under these “no-win, 
no fee” deals because the only financial risk to which they were exposed was liability 
for the defendant’s costs if the case was lost. Even though in most cases this risk was 
only a remote one, further protection was at hand: for a suitable premium, ATE 
insurance could be arranged so as to relieve the claimant of any concern over funding 
his claim. Damages could thus be sought at no financial risk to the claimant. 
                                                 
9 D. Marshall, ‘A Short History of the Costs Wars’ (2010) 20 (4) APIL Focus 24. 
10 The Conditional Fee Agreements Order 1995 SI No 1674 made under the Courts and Legal Services 
Act 1990. 
11 In practice in nine out of ten personal injury cases the uplift in fees is limited by industry wide 
agreements. In road traffic accident cases it is restricted to 12.5%, in employment accident cases to 
25%, and in employment disease cases to 27.5%. Civil Procedure Rules Part 45 sections III, IV and V. 
G. Wignall (ed) Conditional Fees, a Guide to CFAs and Litigation Funding (London: The Law 
Society, 2008). 
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 Liability insurers and public body defendants acting as self-insurers, such as the 
National Health Service, viewed these developments with dismay because the cost of 
the changes fell upon them. They were responsible for paying not only the success fee, 
but also the cost of the ATE insurance. Insurers considered that the result was an 
unreasonable increase the cost of litigation, and they fought a series of bitter wars in 
the courts in an effort to contain the effect of the changes upon them. This satellite 
litigation produced by the complex rules on costs was without parallel anywhere in the 
world.12 It proved largely unsuccessful for insurers. Overall the funding risk has been 
transferred from the state’s legal aid system to private sources, with the cost initially 
falling upon defendants and their insurers. Ultimately, of course, it is the public at 
large who meets the bill, albeit by a more circuitous route than via direct taxation. 
It is not only defendants and insurers that have been subjected to increasing 
financial risk as a result of the funding changes. In those relatively few claims which 
produce no damages at all claimant lawyers working on a CFA may also suffer loss. 
Financial risk management and concerns about disbursement costs and the firm’s cash 
flow have become key features of claimant personal injury work. Such matters when 
coupled with continuous revision of the civil procedure rules often seem to take 
precedence over more traditional concerns about liability issues. The changes have 
affected not only the type of injury claim that a firm accepts but also the stage at 
which that claim may be settled. For example, for some firms the complexities of 
litigating industrial disease cases and the financial risks involved has meant that they 
have become too difficult to run. Instead of dealing with such claims firms might 
prefer the more economically attractive scenario, as described in a practitioner 
seminar, of a double-decker bus crash next to the law firm’s office where a large 
number of straightforward claims can be processed from the one incident. Access to 
the legal system - especially for the less usual, more problematic, type of claim - has 
changed. 
                                                 
12 Zuckerman n 3 above, 264. 
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JACKSON’S MAIN PROPOSALS 
Jackson identifies the CFA regime together with these recent changes in funding as 
major factors which have led to an excessive rise in the cost of litigation.13 Costs are 
said to be disproportionate to the damages obtained especially in the mass of personal 
injury claims which are settled for less than £5,000. The criticisms of CFAs are that 
claimants have no interest in or control over the costs which may be incurred in their 
name; the resulting costs burden upon defendants is excessive, and forces the 
admission of liability in spite of the prospects of a successful defence; and finally, 
claimant lawyers may chose only to take on the most lucrative cases and this tends to 
demean them in the eyes of the public.14 
Although Jackson accepts that CFAs and ATE have a role to play in facilitating 
access to justice, he considers that the cost should not be borne by defendants. The 
key strategy he proposes is to transfer their costs to claimants and their lawyers. His 
main recommendation is that neither success fees in CFAs nor ATE premiums should 
be recoverable.15 This is his “most urgent” reform. 
To offset this, he makes two other sets of recommendations in favour of claimants. 
He does so in an attempt to reduce the risk that, because of the changes, they may 
have to pay for their lawyer’s success fee and for the premium charged for their ATE. 
First, he proposes that there be one-way cost shifting in personal injury cases so as to 
obviate the need for ATE.16 This means that whereas the defendant will continue to 
pay the claimant’s costs if the case succeeds, if it fails no claim for costs can be made 
by the defendant. To a large extent this reflects current practice because costs against 
                                                 
13 Final Report n 1 above, para 3.26. 
14 Final Report n 1 above, para 4.19. 
15 Final Report n 1 above, para 2.2. 
16 Final Report n 1 above para 4.7. 
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claimants are seldom recovered, and defendants therefore derive little benefit from the 
existing two-way cost shifting. Instead they will now benefit much more by not having 
to pay the claimant’s ATE premiums. One-way cost shifting is seen as the simpler and 
cheaper alternative because claimants will not have to pay for any insurance. 
The second set of proposals aimed at protecting claimants deal with the risk that 
they may now have to meet the cost of any success fee out of their own pocket. 
Jackson begins by imposing a limit upon the level of this success fee: it is not to 
exceed a quarter of the damages paid excluding any compensation awarded for future 
economic loss. This may be a difficult calculation to make given that damages in 
settled cases are rarely agreed across all or even any heads of damage and it is only the 
bottom line figure that is accepted by both sides. To enable claimants more easily to 
pay the success fee Jackson also proposes that general damages for pain, suffering and 
loss of amenity be increased by ten per cent.17 This increase is intended to leave the 
great majority of claimants whose claims settle early no worse off than at present, 
although the empirical evidence for this balancing act equating the cost of the success 
fee with the rise in damages has not been made public. In criticism of the proposal one 
London law firm, after carrying out a study of its own cases, concluded that in serious 
injury cases claimants would suffer considerably. It found that where damages 
exceeded £250,000 the average claimant would be £47,000 worse off.18 
In line with his opposition to unnecessary costs, Jackson is in favour of extending 
the present fixed costs regime. This applies to road traffic cases which settle before 
issue for up to £10,000.19 He would extend the scheme to all personal injury cases 
                                                 
17 Final Report n 1 above, para 5.3. 
18 J. Chamberlain, “Stewart’s Law Response to Jackson on Costs.”  
http://www.stewartslaw.com/stewarts-laws-response-to-final-report-by-lj-jackson.aspx 
19 The amount was fixed as £800 plus 20% of damages agreed up to £5,000 and 15% of damages 
agreed between £5,000 and £10,000. A new streamlined system involving online procedures was 
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decided in the fast track, that is, for cases up to £25,000.20 To further limit costs 
Jackson also proposes a ban on referral fees in personal injury cases or, as a fallback 
position, that at least they be capped at £200.21 Referral fees are payments made to 
third parties for introducing work to the firm. Although commonly associated with 
claims management companies trawling for accident business, referral fees are also 
paid to BTE insurers for passing on cases to those firms they choose to appoint to 
their panel. The Government recognises that the future of referral fees is especially 
contentious and is awaiting the result of further consultation before expressing its 
view.22 
Finally, and especially worthy of note here, is Jackson’s support of damages-based 
agreements to increase access to justice because CFAs are now to be made less 
attractive.23 Jackson would permit contingent fees to be used for the first time in 
contentious civil litigation although they have been a feature of certain tribunal work 
                                                                                                                                            
introduced in April 2010 with recoverable costs set at three stages in the process by the Civil Procedure 
(Amendment) Rules 2010 SI No 621. 
20 Final Report n 1 above, para 5.8. 
21 Final Report n 1 above, para 5.1. 
22 Ministry of Justice Consultation Paper, n 5 above, section 3.1. The Legal Services Board is 
considering the role and impact of referral fees on costs and access to justice within its field. It has 
provisionally concluded that there is no compelling case for banning them and that it is arguable that 
they have improved access to justice. See its Discussion Document, Referral Fees, Referral 
Arrangements and Fee Sharing (September, 2010) para 5.1. In contrast Lord Young in his Report 
Common Sense Common Safety (2010) 20 strongly supports Jackson’s proposal that such fees be 
banned. 
23 Final Report n 1 above, para 5. 1. For an earlier discussion see the Ministry of Justice, Regulating 
Damage Based Agreements – A Consultation Paper CP10/09 (London: Ministry of Justice, 2009). This 
resulted in the Damages-Based Agreement Regulations 2010 SI No 1206. 
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since 1995.24 By this means the lawyer’s costs can be fixed in advance so as to equal 
an agreed percentage of the damages recovered. Jackson considers that the contingent 
fee should be capped at the same level he thought appropriate for the maximum 
success fee: the reward ought not to exceed a quarter of the total damages, excluding 
any compensation for future losses. The advantages claimed for contingent fees are 
that the costs would clearly be proportionate to the award, and unlike under CFAs, 
lawyers would have incentives not only to control their costs but also to maximise 
damages for their client. Jackson thinks that fears of premature settlement and over-
compensation of lawyers can be limited by regulation. Abuse of the system, for 
example, is to be controlled by solicitors being required to inform clients of the 
different methods of funding, and an independent solicitor must be employed to give 
advice concerning the suitability of the contingent fee. There are obvious difficulties 
here. Widespread objections from almost all groups involved in personal injury 
litigation had little effect upon Jackson. In particular, concern from the Association of 
Personal Injury Lawyers and from trade unions that costs would be taken from 
damages and leave the claimant under-compensated made no impression. Jackson 
considered that these objections arose from claimant satisfaction with the current CFA 
arrangements and that views would change if that regime were reformed.25 The 
prospect of contingency fees thus now looms large as an alternative to the revised 
CFA system. 
Jackson summarises what he hopes will be the overall result of his proposals:  
(i) Most personal injury claimants will recover more damages than they do 
at present, although some will recover less. 
(ii) Claimants will have a financial interest in the level of costs which are 
being incurred on their behalf. 
(iii) Claimant solicitors will still be able to make a reasonable profit. 
                                                 
24 R. Moorhead, ‘An American Future? Contingency Fees, Claims Explosions and Evidence from 
Employment Tribunals’ (2010) 73 (5) MLR 752 – 784. 
25 Final Report n 1 above, para 4.3. 
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(iv) Costs payable to claimant solicitors by liability insurers will be 
significantly reduced. 
(v) Costs will also become more proportionate, because defendants will no 
longer have to pay success fees and ATE insurance premiums.26 
 
JACKSON AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BTE IN AN EXPANDING 
CLAIMS MARKET 
With these various proposals and objectives in mind, how ought we to view the 
possibilities for BTE? In his preliminary report Jackson was enthusiastic about BTE, 
tentatively concluding that promoting its substantial extension would be in the public 
interest.27 However, eight months later this support evaporated and his final report is 
largely non-committal. He makes no recommendation either for or against the use of 
BTE in personal injury cases, although as an add-on to household insurance he 
considers it a beneficial product which should be encouraged.28 He notes that, as with 
all other insurance, it would enable the many to pay for the few. However, overall he 
gives little space to BTE, devoting only nine pages of the 557 in the report to the 
subject and making only one recommendation about it out of over a hundred made in 
total. Why did he not consider in more detail the possible extension of BTE in relation 
to personal injury especially following his radical proposals to change existing sources 
of funding? Before answering this question, we shall look briefly at the remarkable 
growth of BTE and the type of personal injury cases that are presently being litigated. 
                                                 
26 Final Report n 1 above, para 2.7. 
27 Preliminary Report n 1 above, para 4.5. 
28 Final Report n 1 above, para 7.1. 
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Although BTE has been widely used in other countries for many years, it was first 
sold in the UK only in 1974.29 There had been little demand for it partly because 
people were often unaware of the risk of incurring legal costs and, in any event, there 
was a competitor - the protection offered by legal aid. Insurers also faced difficulties 
in pricing the insurance when the cost of litigation was much less predictable in the 
UK than in other countries. Given the relatively few years during which BTE has been 
offered, it is remarkable that eligibility for its benefits has expanded so rapidly: almost 
3 in 5 adults now have some form of this insurance.30 Over 18 million drivers hold it 
as part of their motor insurance, and 14 million householders as part of their buildings 
and contents insurance. In total these number about 22 million people.31 In addition, 
for example, about 7 million workers are entitled to BTE benefits resulting from their 
trade union membership, although this is a declining number. 
This wide penetration of the market has been achieved largely because BTE has 
been sold as an additional benefit to be included in existing motor liability or 
household insurance. In effect, there has been a great deal of inertia selling. Few 
people opt to take out stand alone BTE policies, but they commonly accept legal 
expenses cover as part of a wider package. A factor which may have led to the more 
recent growth of BTE has been the attempt by certain composite insurers to pre-empt 
the possibility of claimants seeking assistance from solicitors operating on a CFA and 
ATE basis. Insurers fear having to pay for what they perceive as unreasonably high 
costs resulting from a combination of inflated premiums in the ATE market and 
                                                 
29 A.E. Holdsworth, ‘The Experience in England’ in W. Pfenningstorf and A.M. Schwartz (eds), Legal 
Protection Insurance (1986, American Bar Foundation, Chicago) 14 and M. Kilian, ‘Alternatives to 
Public Provision: The Role of Legal Expenses Insurance in Broadening Access to Justice: The German 
Experience’ (2003) 30 (1) J Law and Society 31 - 48.  
30 FWD, The Market for ‘BTE’ Insurance (London: Ministry of Justice, 2007) para 3.3. 
31 Mintel, Legal Expenses Insurance (London: Mintel, April 2008). 
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unnecessary work done under CFA agreements. For whatever reason, the growth of 
BTE has been remarkable. 
With the growth of BTE there has been an increase in the number of claims 
brought for personal injury, although this must not be taken to imply that there is a 
clear causal connection between the two. In fact the increase in claims has been very 
uneven over the years, and has been much misunderstood. There is a popular belief 
that a ‘compensation culture’ attitude in the last ten years or so has led to a sustained 
increase in the number of claims. In fact, in 2008 claims were roughly at the same 
level as they were seven years earlier: the statistics deny any suggestion that the 
introduction of CFAs in 2000 led to a ‘have a go’ world and an increase in litigation.32 
The comprehensive figures from the Compensation Recovery Unit that I have 
discussed elsewhere show that there was no such increase in claims in the early years 
of this new millennium.33 
However, it is true that claims have risen by ten per cent in the last two years. More 
importantly, it is also true that in the last forty years or so claims have increased 
substantially: they have more than tripled from an estimated 250,000 in 1973 to 
861,000 in 2009-10,34 and represent one claim each year for every 73 people in the 
                                                 
32 Better Regulation Task Force, Better Routes to Redress (London: Cabinet Office Publications, 2004), 
A. Morris, ‘Spiralling or Stabilising? The Compensation Culture and our Propensity to Claim Damages 
for Personal Injury’ (2007) 70 (3) MLR 349. The most recent report is that of Lord Young, Common 
Sense Common Safety (2010) op cit above n 4. Although he concludes that compensation culture is a 
problem of perception rather than reality, he nevertheless suggests claims have been too easily 
encouraged and that this has been fuelled by the funding changes that have been made. 
33 R. Lewis, A. Morris and K. Oliphant ‘Tort Personal Injury Claim Statistics: Is There a Compensation 
Culture in the UK?’ (2006) 14 (2) Torts Law Journal 158 and [2006] J Personal Injury Law 87. J. 
Hand, ‘The Compensation Culture: Cliché or Cause for Concern?’ (2010) 37 (4) J Law and Society 
569.  
34 The current figure is published by the Compensation Recovery Unit www.dwp.gov.uk/other-
specialists/compensation-recovery-unit/performance-and-statistics/performance-statistics/  
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country. Motor claims have increased at almost twice that overall rate rising from 
102,000 to 674,000. They have increased by 22 per cent in the last two years alone. 
With the continuing decline in work accident claims, motor cases now constitute 78 
per cent of all the claims made. BTE is thus operating in a much expanded litigation 
system from when it first began, and the number and proportion of motor claims has 
risen very considerably. If any reform were specifically directed at road traffic 
accidents it could have a major effect upon the system overall. Jackson should have 
concentrated his attention in this area. 
THE POTENTIAL REFORM OF BTE 
The suggestion put forward here is that legal advice could be more easily available 
if, when forced to purchase insurance against liability in tort, every motorist were also 
required to take out BTE as an addition to the policy. The insurance would benefit not 
only the policyholder and the passengers, but also any pedestrians or other roadusers 
injured by the insured vehicle. The mechanism for effecting the change – compulsory 
third party insurance against motor liability – already exists. As others have often 
noted, it would be relatively easy to build upon it.35 By doing so access to justice 
could be secured for three out of four claims presently brought.36 
A proposal along these lines was included as part of wider reforms put forward by 
the Bar’s Contingency Legal Aid Fund (CLAF) Group. However, the Group proposed 
                                                                                                                                            
The 1973 figure was estimated by the Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and 
Compensation for Personal Injury (1978, cmnd 7054) vol 2 paras 59 and 63, chairman Lord Pearson. 
35 P. Bartrip, ‘No-Fault Compensation on the Roads in Twentieth Century Britain’ (2010) 69 
Cambridge LJ 263 - 286. See also the road accident proposals in the Report of the Royal Commission 
on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury (1978, cmnd 7054) chairman Lord Pearson. 
Lord Neuberger MR recently has argued that no-fault should again be examined by policymakers if we 
fail to achieve proportionate costs in personal injury litigation. 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/speeches/mr-piba-conf-march-2010.pdf  
36 Note 34 above and associated text. 
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that BTE be extended in a much more ambitious manner from that being discussed 
here. The CLAF scheme sought to include not only motorists but also employers and 
occupiers and others. These latter groups would each insure respectively for the 
benefit of those injured at work, or on premises, or elsewhere. Even those injured in 
hospital would be covered. In addition, the Group suggested that protection could be 
extended to include, for example, those suffering a loss as a result of the act of a 
person required to have professional liability insurance cover. According to the Group 
the overall result would be that 
… access to justice for the general public would be increased at no cost to 
the taxpayer and with none of the disadvantages inherent in CFAs and 
many additional advantages. 37 
However, not only is this is a very much broader and more complex scheme than that 
now being put forward, but it is also based on mistaken assumptions. For example, it 
is not the case that occupiers must insure as a matter of law. Instead of supporting this 
broad scheme, the suggestion here is that we concentrate only upon road traffic cases, 
albeit with many of the same goals in mind. 
The main advantage of a motor scheme is that those injured will have ready access 
to legal advice and a fund to cover their costs should their case fail. There would be 
less need than at present to arrange unsatisfactory or expensive funding such as loans 
to claimants to cover the cost of their disbursements. Nor would there be the same 
need to resort to what would be an excessively complicated post-Jackson CFA world. 
As an example of that complexity we are asked to accept that claimants will make 
reasoned choices between law firms based on their competitive marketing of success 
fee levels. This is hard to imagine. Indeed, in a key sentence in the report, Jackson 
admits that there would be difficulties in devising such advertising. Instead he sees the 
future as inevitably involving claims brought on a contingent fee basis: ‘Clients will 
                                                 
37 http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/assets/documents/CCF%20Paper%202%20April%202009.pdf at paras 
123 et seq. 
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no doubt find it easier to grasp the concept of a deduction of a percentage of their 
damages and solicitors will find it easier to advertise on that basis.’38 
The difficulties involved in Jackson’s proposal for a regulated system of contingent 
fees are not discussed in detail here.39 However, that proposal is a major alternative 
with which the possibilities for BTE should be compared. 
Following an increase in ready access to legal advice, the second advantage 
claimed for the BTE proposal is that the system would be more efficient than at 
present because the costs of pursuing the case would be more closely monitored by the 
claimant’s side. Unlike claimants at present, BTE insurers would be directly affected 
by the costs of bringing the case. They would be able to sift claims, using a merits test 
to weed out those which should not be pursued further. They would then be able to 
channel claimants to those who specialise in providing the representation needed. A 
good comparator, from this viewpoint, is the way in which trade unions at present 
enable injured workers to gain expert advice from the handful of specialist firms to 
which unions direct cases. What are the flaws in such a comparison and where might 
the difficulties with an extension of BTE lie? 
THE DIFFICULTIES 
Choice of Lawyer 
At present BTE limits the freedom to choose one’s own lawyer because claimants 
are directed to use firms which are on the firm’s approved panel.40 These firms may be 
located a considerable distance from the claimant’s home. Firms are selected for the 
panel after a closed bidding process intended to ensure that insurers are exposed to the 
                                                 
38 Final Report n 1 above, para 2.5. 
39 But see n 23 above and associated text. 
40 H. Blundell, ‘Free to Choose? BTE Legal Expenses Insurance and Freedom of Choice’ [2004] J 
Personal Injury Law 93. 
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lowest possible risk. In return for limiting their costs and ensuring that the cases are 
dealt with efficiently, panel firms are guaranteed a flow of work from the BTE insurer. 
There are strict service level agreements and audits of the work carried out. At present 
these firms also pay the insurer a referral fee for each case received. Many non-panel 
solicitors object to these features. However, one claimant lawyer has recently argued 
strongly that these criticisms are without foundation and merely reflect firms’ own 
economic interests.41 Here it is suggested that, for several reasons, too much weight 
should not be placed upon the argument that BTE unduly limits the claimant’s 
freedom to choose his solicitor. 
Firstly, it is doubtful whether many claimants in any event make informed choices 
when selecting their solicitor. In spite of extensive advertising, there is little useful 
information enabling them to discriminate between firms easily. Where guidance 
exists, in practice it is rarely used. Secondly, the freedom to choose is restricted in 
other situations and yet attracts little criticism. In particular, when workers take 
advantage of the legal assistance offered by trade unions they are similarly directed to 
specific firms. The restriction here is seen in a positive light because it enables the 
designated firms to establish particular expertise in the specialised cases referred to 
them. If BTE claimants were all to be represented as well as workers are by these 
trade union firms42 there would be little objection to their lack of choice. Thirdly, 
there is some recent evidence that BTE insurers have changed their view and are now 
more prepared to accept a claimant’s choice of lawyer provided the firm is 
experienced in such work.43 Indeed this freedom is already supported in law, at least 
                                                 
41 M. Harvey, ‘Before the Event Legal Expenses Insurance – Why do so Many Seek to Close This 
Access to Justice Gate?’ [2010] J Personal Injury Law 93. For an even more robust defence see P. 
Smith, ‘Panel Solicitors: the Legal Expense Insurer’s Perspective’ (2004) 14 (3) APIL PI Focus 15. 
42 For the success of such specialist firms see H. Genn, Hard Bargaining: Out of Court Settlements in 
Personal Injury Actions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). 
43 J. Rowley [2010] J Personal Injury Law C35. Contrast the evidence given to Jackson by the Law 
Society. Final Report n 1 above para 6.2.  
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from when formal proceedings are issued.44 In spite of this, it must be recognised that 
injured people in practice are still encouraged to accept a panel solicitor even though 
it may not always be convenient for them to do so.45 
Jackson is equivocal in his support of choice. On the one hand, he is prepared to 
support an amendment to the regulations to reinforce the claimant’s right to choose 
his own lawyer from an earlier date than he is allowed at present: the freedom should 
exist from when a letter of claim is first sent rather than only from the later date of 
when formal proceedings are issued. On the other hand, he qualifies this view by 
stating that this change is only to be made if its impact upon the premiums charged for 
BTE would be modest.46 From what has been said above, the problem of choice may 
not now be as significant as some may suppose, although the informal pressure to 
accept a panel solicitor remains. 
Quality of Legal Work 
There are fears that BTE lawyers will not represent their clients as vigorously as 
those operating on a different fee basis. The Trades Union Congress simply states that 
their quality of service is suspect.47 In part this is because of conflicts of interest that 
may arise. For example, in litigation in 2001 it was estimated that Norwich Union 
could be both representing the defendant driver and funding the claimant driver in just 
over six per cent of all its claims.48 More generally, there is concern that BTE lawyers 
may be too ready to compromise a case at a low figure in order to avoid the possibility 
                                                 
44 Directive 87/334, Legal Expenses Directive (1987) OJ L185/77, is supported domestically by the 
Insurance Companies (Legal Expenses Insurance) Regulations 1990 SI No 1159. 
45 P. Abram, In Sure Hands? (London: University of Westminster, 2002). 
46 Final Report n 1 above, para 6.3. 
47 Final Report n 1 above, para 3.3. 
48 Sarwar v Alarm [2002] 1 WLR 125. 
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of defeat even though the case has a high chance of success. They thereby safeguard 
their own costs and ensure that there will be no call upon the resources of the BTE 
insurer. The result has been compared to third party capture whereby defendant 
liability insurers directly contact injured people and settle their claims at a low level, 
assisted by the claimants’ lack of legal representation. This comparison is unfair: an 
undue readiness to settle may affect firms litigating on fee bases other than BTE, 
including where a conditional fee is involved. Even within trade union firms, although 
under-settlement is not a feature, regular assessments are made of the merits of 
proceeding further with a case, and there is awareness of who is ultimately paying the 
bill. Contrary to these criticisms concerning the quality of service provided, one study 
concluded that overall there were distinct advantages in using panel solicitors as 
opposed to those arranged via claims referral companies.49 
Although consumers value face to face contact with their lawyer,50 the BTE panel 
solicitor may be far removed from the area where the claimant lives and contact may 
be confined to mail and telephone calls. The physical distance between the claimant 
and his lawyer has been said to affect the quality of the work done, or at least the 
claimant’s perception of the how well he is being treated. In their defence, insurers 
argue that cases are more efficiently dealt with by a specialised team able to use e-
mail and telephone contact albeit at some distance from the claimant. This may be 
especially the case when dealing with the mass of low value motor vehicle claims. 
However, in the few cases which involve serious injury the potential loss of personal 
contact could be important. The claimant could ensure that contact is possible by 
insisting upon choosing a local lawyer. 
Amount of Work 
                                                 
49 P. Abram, In Sure Hands? (London: University of Westminster, 2002). 
50 J. Robins, Shopping Around: What Consumers Want from the New Legal Services Market (London: 
Jures Publications, June 2010). 
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There is concern that the financial limits set by the BTE policy may be too low, and 
this restricts the work that can be done for the claimant and, in particular, hampers the 
ability to take matters to trial. Commonly a policy may confine the insurer’s liability 
to a ceiling of £50,000, and also excludes cover for certain types of claim such as 
clinical negligence or disease. However, these limits are much less significant here 
because they are usually sufficient for the mass of fast track motor claims of concern 
in this article. In addition, the level of cover could be increased by the insurer if there 
is a high chance of success. However, this may be only a theoretical option because 
these are just the cases where a speedy, low cost resolution might be expected. 
Overall, as yet, there is no empirical evidence to support these various fears about the 
quality of work done in BTE cases, and the concerns do not apply to the vast majority 
of road accident claims. 
Cost of Insurance 
At present the premiums for add-on BTE are exceptionally low, being only about 
£20 for motor51 and slightly less for household policies. However, if we look at 
premiums for BTE in Europe the cost is much higher because the scope of the 
insurance cover provided is much wider and costs are not recoverable. The typical 
premium for a stand- alone policy is well over £200. If we then look at the typical 
premium charged for ATE the cost is higher again. In a fast track road traffic case 
about £350 would be paid, and for other types of claim almost double that sum.52 ATE 
premiums for industrial disease cases cost £1,000 each. For cases above the fast track 
limit of £25,000 premiums rise further so that even for a road traffic case about 
£1,500 would be paid. These higher figures are sometimes cited to illustrate the fear 
that the cost of BTE insurance could rise significantly if the present regime were to 
                                                 
51 Preliminary Report n 1 above, para 2.1. 
52 See the current adverts in the journal Litigation Funding and the general discussion in the Preliminary 
Report n 1 above para 2.3. 
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change. Although Jackson gave no detailed figures, he was persuaded that this might 
happen. There are several reasons for his fears. 
Firstly, if referral fees are abolished, as Jackson proposes, insurers would suffer a 
significant loss and this would have to be reflected in the premiums. The extent of the 
existing subsidy is unknown, although referral fees have been said to be the major 
source of BTE profit53 with one insurer charging between £600 and £900 for cases in 
the fast track.54 However, the fee debate is far from closed and opinion on all sides is 
divided. At present it is very much in doubt whether these fees will indeed be 
abolished.55 
Secondly, it is said that premiums may rise because, at present, insurers are not 
exposed to the true risks involved in providing BTE insurance and this could change. 
The argument is that, having bought the insurance only as an add-on to another policy, 
people are unaware of its existence and do not claim upon it. Attitudes could change if 
BTE were to be emphasised more as it would if it were made compulsory, and if other 
funding mechanisms were made less attractive, as Jackson proposes. Although this 
argument may have some force in connection with household insurance, it is much 
weaker if only motor insurance is considered. Following a road rather than a home 
accident an insured is much more likely to visit a solicitor who, in turn, is legally 
required to inquire of the client whether BTE insurance exists before other forms of 
funding are considered.56 If there is doubt, it is now standard practice to search for and 
examine the relevant policies. Because of this, Jackson does not believe that ignorance 
of the cover which has been purchased is an obstacle to the use of BTE. Contrary to 
                                                 
53 FWD, The Market for ‘BTE’ Insurance (2007, Ministry of Justice) at 4A II 4. 
54 Final Report n 1 above, para 3.18. 
55 N. Rose, ‘Crunch Time on Referral Fees’ (2010) 67 Litigation Funding 3 and see above n 22. 
56 Sarwar v Alarm n 48 above; and see the Solicitors Regulation Authority, Solicitors’ Code of Conduct 
(2007) para 2.03(i)(d)(ii). 
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the limited exposure argument, therefore, it is suggested here that the take-up of BTE 
policies in motor cases does not leave insurers benefitting significantly from policies 
where there might be liability for costs but where indemnities are not being sought. 
There is another, stronger, argument supporting the claim that BTE insurers are not 
facing the true risks. This is that in many BTE cases the insurer merely passes on the 
claim to its panel solicitor, and thereafter it is dealt with on a CFA basis, with ATE 
being taken out. The risks of losing thus fall upon other than the BTE insurer. If it 
were otherwise it is said that BTE premiums would need to rise substantially. 
However, the extent to which CFAs and ATEs are being used when there is also BTE 
is uncertain although DAS, a leading BTE provider, is now said to require solicitors to 
act using a CFA.57 In theory it could be argued that there should be few such cases 
because the Court of Appeal considerably restricted the options in most cases where 
BTE was available, especially if the claim was for less than £5,000.58 However, 
subsequent litigation resulting in a costs war over this decision has not clarified the 
position.59 If Jackson were implemented, success fees and ATE premiums would no 
longer be recoverable anyway, and recourse to BTE would then become more 
important. 
To date there has been no detailed empirical investigation into how BTE operates 
in practice, and how it is in fact financed. This means that no estimate can be made of 
the extent that premiums would have to rise if BTE were to be used in all road 
accident claims. Would insurers really be exposing themselves to a much increased 
                                                 
57 Chamberlain n 18 above. Most insurers use CFAs according to J. Robins, ‘Before the Deluge’ (2010) 
69 Litigation Funding 6. 
58 Sarwar v Alarm n 48 above. 
59 Most recently, the failure to inquire into BTE was ignored in relation to success fees, but not ATE, 
claimed under a CFA in a low value case in Kilby v Gawith [2009] 1 WLR 853. Jackson would reverse 
this decision and make BTE relevant to the success fee. Final Report n 1 above para 5.26. See also J. 
Rowley, ‘Is it Too Soon to Reconsider Prematurity?’ [2010] J Personal Injury Law 39. 
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liability for the unsuccessful cases? Given the present very high success rate of motor 
claims, the prospect of insurers being liable for costs is confined to a very small 
percentage of all actions brought. Limiting the reform of BTE to road traffic cases 
means that insurers would not be exposed to problematic claims such as those for 
disease or for clinical errors. Nor could they be sued for other than personal injury as 
happens in other European countries where claimants can even rely upon BTE to 
begin a class action in a commercial dispute.60 Instead of an increase in costs, it could 
be argued that there would be savings and efficiencies produced by dealing with all 
motor vehicle cases via compulsory BTE. Indeed at present Jackson notes that, in 
spite of the low premiums charged, BTE insurers in motor claims receive more money 
than they pay out. Their position would be further safeguarded by one way cost 
shifting. As a result, an affordable increase in the premiums collected from all drivers 
may be sufficient to fund the few failed claims that are brought. Of course, because of 
the much larger group involved in paying these premiums, they would be substantially 
lower than those presently levied for ATE where it is already known that the claimant 
has need of legal assistance. Under BTE the many who might need assistance would 
help pay for the few who actually do. Overall, therefore, the rise in the premium 
required may be much lower than has been feared.  
CONCLUSION 
As already noted, Jackson refused to make any recommendation either for or 
against BTE although initially he was attracted by the potential benefits arising from 
the wide ranging CLAF scheme. However, he specifically rejected the idea being 
promoted here that BTE should be made a compulsory feature of motor insurance. 
The idea, he says, met with strong opposition. 
However, these opponents may not have had in mind the radical changes to 
funding contained elsewhere in the Jackson report. For example, in spite of the many 
problems of ATE, it has been thought reckless to remove it for those do not have 
                                                 
60 Case C-199/08 Eschig v Uniqua Sachversicherung [2009] ECR I-8295. 
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BTE.61 In addition, Jackson noted that there was significant support for an extension 
of BTE. Both the Forum of Insurance Lawyers and the Council of Circuit Judges were 
in favour of compulsion, whilst the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers supported 
the use of BTE provided that the freedom to choose one’s own lawyer was not 
curtailed. The Conservative party, whilst welcoming Jackson’s proposals, said that it 
would work with the Bar to improve the CLAF scheme and that it would discuss with 
insurers the extension of BTE.62 This approach was further endorsed in a report for 
the Prime Minister by Lord Young who commented that extending BTE might be a 
fair solution to the problem of extending access to justice.63 The Government would 
welcome a change of culture so that greater use is made of BTE but in its Consultation 
Paper on the reforms it does not mention the possibility of making such insurance 
compulsory.64 
This article suggests that the provision of compulsory BTE for motor vehicles 
would enable three quarters of all the tort claims made for personal injury to be 
litigated efficiently and with ready access to legal advice.65 By confining the CLAF 
proposals to road traffic claims alone much can be done with relative ease. In a post-
Jackson world where success fees and ATE premiums are not recoverable, the 
provision of BTE offers an acceptable solution to what otherwise could be a very 
different (and perhaps contingent fee) world. The solution is not without its problems, 
but it merits a more detailed analysis than Jackson had time to provide. 
                                                 
61 N. Kinsella, ‘Evolution not Revolution’ in J. Robins (ed), Closing the Justice Gap (London:  the 
Solicitors Journal, 2010). 
62 See the then Shadow Justice Minister’s article, Henry Bellingham, ‘Worth Fighting For’ in Robins 
(ed) ibid. 
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